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C O N T E N T S

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

The Idea Personality as a Basis of Ethics

John Delos Jones

Clement of Alexandria: His Life and Writings

Gerald Kennedy

The Religious Aspects of the Theory of Value

Lo Ch'uan-Fang

The Organization of the Primitive Christian Church

Charles B. Mobley

The Later Life of St. Paul after the Close of
the Acts of the Apostles

Yoshiyuki Nakagami

THE IDEA PERSONALITY

AS A

BASIS OF ETHICS

by

John Delos Jones

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CONTENTS

I. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PERSONALITY

Original meaning of the word person.....	1.
Boethius definition of person the standard of the Middle Ages..	5.
The modern meaning of the word person.....	6.
Essential elements in personality.....	10.
The metaphysical significance of personality.....	12.

II. PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

Personality vs. soul.....	15.
Relation of individuality to personality.....	17.
Individual only partially free.....	20.

III. PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY

Personality develops through contact with other persons.....	22.
The Family and personality.....	24.
The State and personality.....	26.
The Church and personality.....	30.

IV. PERSONALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE

Two views of human nature.....	32.
It is disesteem which causes man's inhumanity to man.....	34.
Why do men do right?.....	34.
Conclusion.....	36.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PERSONALITY

I.

In the long course of human thought person has had successively dramatic, legal, theological and psychological meanings. In our present-day usage, "person" as a psychological and philosophical term is used interchangeably with personality. The concept of person or personality in man expresses for us the source and substance of his moral being; it signifies his whole spiritual selfhood. Yet the concept is not old. We cannot translate it back into Greek, the mother of our ethical terms. Plato and Aristotle have no adequate expression for it. They talked about the man, not about the person, when they wished to designate what was peculiar to man. It denotes progress, does it not? when a later period is able to define such a concept as person.

How, then, did "person", persona, come to be the expression of the innermost moral essence, the expression of that which is most characteristic in man? How came it, in the progress of usage, to mean personality?

The etymology of the word persona is not definitely agreed upon. Our best dictionaries of today fail to throw light on the root of the word. Funk and Wagnalls', New Standard Dictionary (1930) says "persona" means a mask for actors and that it comes from the Latin per, through and sonus, sound. The New Century Dictionary, does not give the meaning of person or persona. A New English Dictionary, says persona means, "a mask used by a player, a character or personage acted, one who plays or performs any part, a being having legal rights, a juridical person;

in late use a human being in general; also in Christian use (Tertullian c.200) a "person" of the Trinity." According to this source, persona is generally thought to be related to personare to sound through. However, it is pointed out that the long o makes a difficulty. This is in agreement with the derivation given by Jacob Grimm.*

Many of the old derivations give us still shades of meaning that may be of value. J.C. Scaliger* suggests that the origin is to be found in peri soma, around the body, or in peri zoma, around the waist. An ancient vocabulary, says Trendelenburg, gives persona as per se una, one in or of itself. A still deeper meaning is given by another derivation which he cites. Ona in Latin signifies fullness. Hence persona, that is per se ona means fullness in or of itself. A person in this case would be an individual who had fulfilled or filled out his self.

Clement C.J. Webb feels that the term persona is best translated in English by the word "party".**

All of these derivations are interesting and give us shades of meaning, but they only show that the family relationship of persona has not yet been definitely established. Let us, then, turn to the meaning which alone concerns us here.

*Jacob Ludwig Karl Grimm (1785-1863), German philologist, better known in popular circles as the author of Grimm's Fairy Tales. In his academic treatise Denkschriften, 1858, Über die Vertretung männlicher durch weibliche Namensformen (On the Representation of Masculine Substantives by Feminines), p.49 persona is in the masculine group of name-words represented by feminine nouns. He accepts the derivation from personare, but explains the sense of the term in another way. Comp. Trendelenburg: A Contribution to the History of the Word Person, p.7

*Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) was an Italian scholar, very much at home in the classics and a leader of his time. Trendelenburg gives his derivation in, "Contribution to the History of the Word Person", p.6

**Clement C.J. Webb: God and Personality, p.36

Person first acquired a philosophical significance in connection with the Trinity. In the year 362 in the time of Julian the Apostate an entire church council was held at Alexandria to investigate and determine the meaning of the term "person." The Greek church fathers held that the Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit were three hypostases, while the Latin fathers regarded the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as three prosopon. Now hypostasis means literally "a standing under or below." Boethius pointed out that "the Greeks called individual substance hypostases because they underlie the rest and offer support and substrate to what are called accidents."^{*} But prosopon meant face and suggested more than did persona a mere aspect or role. Prosopon used in connection with the Trinity would thus suggest the threefold aspect of the godhead, while hypostasis would subordinate the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to the godhead. The Greek fathers refused to use prosopon and the Latin fathers hypostasis, whereupon the council was declared to be quibbling about words. However, after the council, the word persona or prosopon became synonymus with hypostasis coming thus to be used generally by the Latin-speaking theologians of the Christian Church.

Thus in theology, persona, which originally meant the mask of the stage, came to take on a philosophical meaning. It gained the meaning of an individual, of a rational essence which is self-existent.

*Boethius: Contra Eutychen, III, 63. Anicius Manlius Stevernius Boethius, was born about 480 A.D., and was put to death in the year 524. The authenticity of Contra Eutychen has been questioned, but is now generally accepted as genuine. Boethius was the last of the Roman philosophers and the first of the scholastic theologians.

II.

During the Middle Ages writers were indebted to Boethius for the standard definition of the period. From that time on the general history of the term "person" had its course charted on lines determined for it in this standard. And in the general stream of thought the word itself has changed its meaning according to the prevailing belief that persona came from hypostasis, which meant an independent and unchangeable individuality, or from prosopon which implied social relationships and voluntary activity.

Boethius' definition, which became classical, occurs in his treatise Contra Eutychen and runs as follows: Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia, that is, a person is the individual substance of a rational nature. This definition, it will be noted, brings out both the individual and universal elements in personality. When we say person we describe that which we so designate as an individual, not as a universal. On the other hand rational nature taken by itself is a universal and is not a person. Yet we cannot have an individual person whose nature is not rational, for a person is an individual conscious of universality.

We cannot, therefore, say that an individual stone is a person, for even though we see a common nature between it and other stones, the stone itself is not aware of this universality. In like manner we refrain from calling an animal such as a horse or a dog, a person because it does not reflect upon such things as common nature. Some animals may be conscious of others, but not conscious of self. Children who have not yet arrived at the stage of reflective thinking, are, for this reason, not called persons, It is only mature individuals who

are aware of his or her self as being at once distinct from other selves and as having something in common with these others that we call persons, who are personalities.

We agree with Clement C.J.Webb in Divine Personality and Human Life when he says that the Boethian definition of a person implies the possession of rationality by those to whom it is applied. Hence it should be used only of such human beings as have come to "years of descretion" and should not, except with a certain playfulness, be used in speaking of a child as a person. This aspect of the term person we need to bring into more common usage. We must not wear down and dull our definitions by loose thinking and careless usage. We must keep our tools sharp by constantly holding them to the grindstone of new truths.

III.

Boethius' definition overlooks the social element in personality. Persons are by their very nature social beings. They cannot exist apart from society. It is only when we have one individual over against another individual that personality arises. But this brings us to the question of the modern idea of personality.

We do not want a rigid definition, for definitions admit of some loophole. We cannot hand out a nicely wrapped and tied package labeled "Definition of Personality" and expect that upon opening it, all the meanings which the word conotes as well as denotes will jump out at us like a jack-in-the-box. Definitions are by their very nature limiting and personality cannot be limited. What we desire is to distinguish the various usages of the term so that we can be put on our guard against misunderstanding.

It is a difficult matter to define personality, for it is a word that most of us take for granted as having concise meaning until we try to express that meaning in words. When we do we discover that it is a somewhat vague conception which one may twist and warp to fit any meaning one may choose. R.G.Gordon has pointed out that one reason for this difficulty is that most definitions are given in terms of the component parts of the whole, whereas personality can only have a meaning if thought of in terms of a synthesis.* It is one thing to take a watch to pieces to see what makes it go and quite another thing to put it together to understand its construction. Let us, then, gather our materials and see if we cannot put them together in an understandable whole.

We have today many schools, classes and cults representing various phases of psychology. Some recognize personality as something apart from the material world, some do not. Some psychologists have set themselves the task of analyzing human behavior with particular emphasis upon isolating, describing and classifying the contents of the 'stream of consciousness'* in such a manner that they may be stated in the form of mental laws. Some psychologists tell us that man's personality is conditioned by his nerves, his glands, his stomach, his hands. So we^{have} the psychoanalyst, the behaviorist, the endocrinologist, and a host of others all saying that personality is 'Nothing-But'** this or that.

*R.G. Gordon: Personality, p.1.

†Comp. J.H.Coffin: Personality in the Making, p.24. According to Watson is not a psychologist is this view is granted.

**John M. Fletcher is an article "The Philosophy of Nothing-But", which appeared in the Jan.1931 Hibbard Jr. warns against intolerance in saying that Nothing But this or that is true.

The endocrinologist set forth the idea that an individual's personality is regulated by the glands. Berman, I think, is the chief exponent of this belief. On page 107 of his book, The Glands Regulating Personality, he tells us that "Character, indeed, is an alloy of the different standard intravisceral pressures of the organism, a fusion created by the resistance or counter-pressure of the obstacle in the environment. Character, in short, is the gland intravisceral barometer of a personality." Personality is the measure of resistance if the above is true.

The argument which is put forth by the endocrine enthusiasts as carrying so much weight is that careful examination shows that no disease or disturbance of any of the glands of internal secretion happens without some corresponding change in personality.* There is something in the argument and it would be quite convincing if it were not for the fact that it is extremely difficult to say which comes first, an alteration in the endocrine glands or a change in personality.

Having considered the endocrinologist we turn now to the behaviorists who give everything an environmental turn. Personality is the result of an organized set of reactions to the environment. Such a view makes man a mere machine; it strips him of all worth, all moral value. It says that there is no such thing as personality.

It is impossible for the psychologist to provide a complete picture, a complete analysis and description of the factors entering into personality. Personality is a picture that must draw its colors from the norm-

*Comp. A.A.Roback: The Psychology of Character p.339, where he gives the essence of an article by L.Berman, "Anthropology and the Endocrine Glands," The Scientific Monthly, 1925, vol.xxi

ative sciences as well as the descriptive.

I do not mean to say that we must throw out all the heredity elements, that is, all the bodily and mental dispositions, both actual and potential, with which the individual is equipped at birth. Neither are we to disregard the fact of environment, for a human being must always be considered in relation to his surroundings if we are to get a comprehensive view. Personality is a unity, what the individual is as a whole, the contrapletion* between the bodily and mental attitudes of the individual in relation to the environment in the most comprehensive sense.

The popular conception of personality is a qualitative one, an aesthetical view. A little book by Eugene E. Dodd* expresses this idea beautifully. He says, "Personality is the manner in which you present and express yourself in your face-to-face relations with other people. To be able to approach people easily, impress them favorably, and talk with them pleasantly is a resource of the highest importance to any person who would live a happy, useful life in our social world. Yet such ability comes only with intention and practice." This is the general view of personality as held by the man in the street. It is the cut of your clothes, the way you walk, the language you use to express yourself. Personality here is something external which one may work for. This idea overlooks the fact that personality is a spiritual and not a physical something. To become a person you need to lose

*Contrapletion is a term coined by Prof. Buckham to show polarity. Thus, in light and darkness we have contrapletion. There is something in the one which is needed for the completion of the other. The term is in contrast with contradiction which means that which is diametrically opposite, such as true, false.

*Eugene E. Dodd: Fiber and Finish, p. 40

your self. The individual must be submerged in the general theme that he may stand out as a personality. The criminal may have all the poise and bearing of royalty, may use perfect grammar and wear fine clothes and still he is not a person. Why we shall see later.

Under the picture of a beautiful horse Dodd makes this statement, "This beautiful horse has a personality which sets her apart from the average."^{*} This is mere individuality, not personality. Personality can not be ascribed to animals as Boethius pointed out. This calling of animals as personalities is the old idea of a mask or outward appearance which still persists in the minds of the unthinking.

Personality, then, is a dynamic and progressing unity. It is an achievement which transcends the body, yet is immanent in it. Perhaps we can best show what is meant by an example from everyday life. A radio station sends out on the ether, wave forms which are picked up by the receiver. The quality of the reproduced sounds depends upon the receiving set. Now we have here pure mechanical response. But, we have behind the broadcasting station, rationality. It is operated on a plan. The quality and quantity of the wave forms emanated may be varied at the will of the mind behind the controls. There is a possibility that something may not go according to plan. That is, there is control to a certain extent, yet at the same time there is freedom. Now the Supreme or Perfect Personality corresponds to the mind behind the broadcasting station. Natural man is the receiver. As the receiver becomes more and more perfect it is better able to reproduce faithfully the original sound or wave form. But it can never produce the original. It can only become a good copy.

* *ibid.*p.93

As a man "comes to himself"* and realizes his place in the world he is better able to fulfill himself. We have now to account for freedom, still using our analogy. As before, we have rationality at work. When a man has come to himself, when he has become a personality, he sees life as it really is and knows he has duties to perform in his relation with other beings in society. Just as natural man may select the program he wishes on his radio, personality is attained when a man is able to realize his duties and rights in life. Just as the receiver has no meaning apart from the broadcast station, persons have no meaning apart from the Perfect Personality, or visa versa. Personality can only arise in a bipolar situation in which there is the recognition of reciprocal rights and duties.

When an individual no longer responds to every idea he picks up, which results in a blurring of his thinking, as it does of tone, but when he can out of the maze of thoughts pick out the one purpose which seems to lead to the end in life which he may select, always keeping in mind his relations to others, their rights and duties, as well as his own, his relation to God, His rights and duties; and the knowledge that he is, in a sense, an end in himself, then has he achieved personality.

IV.

We have found that personality cannot be explained in the terms of the sense world alone, that the spiritual world is necessary for a complete view. We discovered that personality needs a society for its existence, that it is only through the reciprocal rights and duties

*Woodrow Wilson: When a Man Comes to Himself. In this little essay Woodrow Wilson has set forth the principle of personality as a "becoming."

that personality comes into being. Let us turn now to an examination of the essential elements of personality that we may form a still truer conception of it.

Knudson says that there are three essential elements involved in the idea of personality which must be included in any adequate definition of it. These are, individuality, consciousness and will.* He points out that while Bowne mentions only two primary factors, self-consciousness, or the power to know and self-direction, or self-control, the idea of individuality is implied in the term "self". Hence we have again the three elements which he declares as primary. Rashdall singles out five elements in his analysis of personality.** which Knudson promptly reduces to three. Instead of consciousness, permanence, a self-distinguishing identity, individuality, and activity, we have individuality consciousness and will, since permanence and self-distinguishing identity are manifestly implied in the idea of individuality and consciousness. John Wright Buckham finds four constituents elements in personality, namely self-consciousness, unity, freedom, and worth.** We see at once that worth is a new factor and one which is in important aspect of personality. Let us consider briefly these four elements of personality and see if we do not agree essentially with Prof. Buckham.

Personality is self-conscious. This is the sole property of a self. To be able to be at once a subject and object, to be able to say I am an I is self-consciousness and most certainly is a primary factor

*Kindson: The Philosophy of Personalism, p.82.

**Rashdall: Personal Idealism, ed. Henry Sturt pp.370-372

***John Wright Buckham: Personality and the Christian Ideal pp.12-21

in personality.

The second element of personality is individuality. Every self is unique, unprecedented and unrepeatable. This involves unity and identity. The self is the same in change. It must be the same yesterday, today and forever. The evidence of this is found in memory. Then the self is also a unifying agent. It unifies experiences, unifies sense perception of a wide and diverse realm of thought and action, of past and present into an ordered whole. But personality does not only create unity, it repairs a broken unity. In this process the self knows itself as the unifying agent. Hence the self as individual is also unifying.

Freedom is the third element, for only as free can personality exist. Man is an end unto himself and hence is a rational being capable of a rational decision which is the essence of his freedom. Kant attributes freedom and end in himself to personality. A rational and free being by virtue of the very fact that he is rational and free, stands apart from the world of things; he is an end in himself or a personality.

Here is where the final and crowning element of personality enters. Closely connected with freedom, since it involves choice, is worth. One of Kant's great contributions was his view of the worth of man. All things have value, a market price, but man alone has worth. This contribution has directed life into better paths and the concept has found its way into Christian ethics. Prof. Buckham is right in adding worth as the fourth element in personality.

V.

What is the metaphysical significance of personality?

The person has many ideas, does many things and is subject to constant change, yet is conscious of itself as one and as identical with

itself. Here we have unity and identity connected with plurality and change. Since the days of the Greek speculative philosophy, metaphysicians have tried to conceive of reality in such a way as to provide for both unity and plurality, identity and change. In personality, then, we have an empirical solution of the problem with which metaphysics has wrestled for so long. Personality, we see, becomes the key to ultimate reality. "It is in personality that individuality finds its only adequate realization. It is personality alone that has the characteristics necessary to a basal unity. It is in personal agency that we have the source of the idea of causality and its only self-consistent embodiment. It is the reality of personality that constitutes the foil to the phenomenality of matter, space, and time and renders it intelligible. From every point of view it is thus evident that in personality we have the crown of the personalistic system, the keystone in its arch the masterlight of all our metaphysical seeing."*

The more the principles of personality are realized in particulars, the more it testifies to the richness and fulness of existence. It is a positive and fertile principle. "It is one of the most fertile principles which has ever been able to establish itself."*

The concept of Perfect Personality throws light also upon the meaning of creation. Personality is by its very nature creative. It is the nature of self-activity to express itself to embody itself in form. All persons create.**

Among the objections to personality and especially to personality

*Knudson: The Philosophy of Personalism, p.238

*Hoffding: The Philosophy of Religion, p.316

**Comp. John Wright Buckham: The Humanity of God p.60.

in God is one which rests upon the assertion that God is infinite, which means literally without limitation. Hence we cannot speak of a Supreme Personality because personality is a limitation, say these objectors. We have seen however, that personality is not a limiting concept. On the contrary, we saw that personality could not be defined because it could not be limited.

It used to be asserted that the principle of personality was disintegrating and negative. On the face of it personality put differences in the place of unity and that which was common to all, But personality does not isolate individuals. It makes them conscious of their universality. Instead of creating chaos, personality adds unity; it is a unifying principle. Höffding has pointed out that "the principle of personality, like all great thoughts, may be misunderstood and misapplied. A man may think he is realizing it when he withdraws himself from the influence of all example and all instruction through tradition and the experiences of other men, but in this way he only ends by being 'a fool of his own making'!"*

We have now a key with which to unlock the puzzle box of our every day relations to each other. We have the frame-work through which we shall try to catch a glimpse of ethics. But before the final picture can be drawn we must consider the relation of personality to individuality and the relation of personality to society.

*Höffding: The Philosophy of Religion p.312

PERSONALITY AND INDIVIDUALITY

I.

We have considered briefly the history of the word person and we have formulated an idea of what personality is. We need now to consider the distinction between this conception and others to which it would seem to be closely related. Let us begin by asking. What is the difference between "soul" and "person" or "personality"?

Before man could formulate an idea of the soul it was necessary for him to distinguish between the bodily self and the world of the not-self. He had first to make the distinction between his own body and other bodies. The next step, the distinction between, the bodily self and the psychical self or the distinction between the body and soul is a comparatively late product of human reflection. In Greek thought we do not find it before Plato.*

The primitive notion of the soul was that of a ghost or spirit, generally a "double" of the body, a finer and more subtle material facsimile of the body. The soul could leave and reenter the body; it was like a shadow, an image of the man himself. It was sometimes thought of as a bird, but more often it was thought to be the breath (nephesh, ruah, anima, spiritus, psyche, thumos, pemuma.)^{*}

*Socrates often speaks of a "sign" or "inner voice" which frequently warned him when he was about to do that which was not for his good. Plato usually makes him speak of it as divine, "the sign of God." cf. The Trial and Death of Socrates Crito Phaedo and the Republic, book X, for Plato's view of the soul.

*Leighton: Man and the Cosmos, p.89

The development of reason and conscious self-control brought about a rational conception of the spiritual being. Instead of a material ghost or double there grew up a belief in the non-material or spiritual character of the soul. This called for an explanation of the origin of the soul. Thus in the history of thought, we have three chief theories which attempt to account for the origin of the soul. These theories are:

1. The Preexistence Theory. According to this doctrine the souls are eternal and are of a fixed number. In the form which Plato gives to this view the soul enters our world of space and time from the world of eternal essences or ideas. After death the soul passes either upward or downward to the world of its next embodiment, according to the manner in which it has conducted itself here.

2. The Traducian Theory. This view holds that the souls of offspring are generated from the souls of their parents, as their bodies are from the bodies of their parents. According to this doctrine Adam was the only soul created by God; all other souls or beings are indirect creations.

3. Special Creation Theory. This theory holds as its name implies, that each soul is produced by a special act of creation of God. It does not, however, take into account the facts of mental and moral heredity.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to account for the origin of the soul. What we need is an understandable meaning of the term. We will say, then, that the soul is a non-material spiritual entity which is in the first instance psycho-physical. From the standpoint of some psychologies* it is an inner sense, which we must not

*

*We have today largely psychology without a "soul."

confuse with introspection. The word soul means simply "awareness" at its lowest level, a sensation of the presence of something as when a child distinguishes its mother.

The distinction between "soul" "self" and "person" thus becomes a subtle one, yet one that we need to keep always in mind. The soul may be regarded as the unrealized self; the lowest form of human consciousness. The self is distinguished from the soul by being focalized; the assertion of the ego, I am an I. A person is an I ought as over against I am an I. He is a self in association with another self when there is the mutual recognition of rights and duties. A person may be defined as a self who has become of worth,* hence the self is a potential person and the soul is a future self. All souls become selves but not all selves become persons.

II'

We need now to answer the questions, What is an individual? and What is the difference between a person and an individual? in order that we may have a fuller view of personality.

"Individual" means in the first place indivisible; a true individual can never be broken up into its parts. Webster's Dictionary defines individual as "athing incapable of being divided without losing its identity." An individual, then, is that in which there are no parts.

*The idea of worth in personality is coming more and more to the front. For a separate study see, "The Worth of the Person" a thesis by Lester V. Wiley in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in the philosophy department at the Pacific School of Religion, 1931.

*"Individual is a term over which many controversies have been waged both in the schools of philosophy and biology. From the biologist's point of view Hans Driesch's book, The Problem of Individuality is excellent. Bernard Bosanquet in, The Principle of Individuality and Value, uses individuality in the same manner in which personality is here used.

But we must be careful not to carry this conception to an extreme, for we would end in a pantheism.

By individual I mean any being that is an indivisible unity of diverse parts in which the unity and the diversity are interdependent. It is possible to divide or disintegrate an individual, but it immediately ceases to be an individual. An individual, then, is an organism and not a machine. In a machine the parts can be assembled, taken apart and reassembled, or parts must grow into the whole. We see, then, that individuality involves living unity in diversity. It involves uniqueness of being and life, but not isolation. For example, sheep are known only as so many sheep to the passer-by, but they are known as so many individual sheep to the shepherd because he sees the uniqueness of each sheep.

How are we to distinguish personality from individuality? We have seen that a person is an individual. But not all individuals are persons. Individuality is of the natural order, whereas personality transcends the sense world. A person is an individual who has had a spiritual rebirth, who has entered the transcendent world. Hence, a person, the rational individual, is not only recognized by others, but recognizes himself as both unique and individual and social; he is aware of something beyond himself. Individuality is characterized by independence of other individuals, whereas personality is cooperation with other individuals.

Since personality is a quality that transcends time and space, an individual, as in the case of the self, may go through life without becoming a person. An historical example of an individual not becoming

a person is to be seen in Napoleon.* Here we have the case of an individual who does not recognize the rights of others. Instead of aspiring to at least the partial fulfillment of the Christian Ideal (the Kingdom of God, symbolized in the Cross.) or the Platonic Ideal (the Good, the True, the Beautiful,) his ambition was to fulfill his own desires without thought of others. This is pure self-realization* which always ends in a super-egoist, or, to use Professor Buckham's term, a selfist. On the other hand, consider the individual who sees no ideal, such as the Christian or the Platonic Ideal, and who is not ambitious of achieving his own desires -- the self-sacrificing individual. Obviously such an individual has not the capacity of self-realization. He is self-sacrificing, not for the sake of self-realization, for he has no ideal, but because he sees nothing else. The ultimate end of such an individual is virtual suicide. Either of these two individuals is an idiot in the sense that he is a man of but one idea, self-sacrifice or self-realization, and hence, is not a person. I have said that a criminal is not a person no matter what his outward appearance. The reason he is not is that he is a self-satisfying individual; he does not take into account the rights, duties and often the lives of others.

*In popular psychology Napoleon is often referred to as a man with a very dynamic personality. Most people appear quite shocked with the idea that he was not a person, that he had not achieved personality. The reason for this, it is needless to point out, is to be found in the common view that personality is a qualitative something which is acquired by tilting one's nose at just the right angle.

*I am using the term self-realization in the narrower sense of self-satisfaction. That is to say a self-realizing individual sees only his own goal and is not aware of the existence of others.

III.

An individual has not the capacity to recognize others. Napoleon, as we have said, was an individual and not a person because his ambition was self-realization without recognition of others; or, in the other individual we considered, self-sacrifice alone did not make a person. Personality is the contrapletion of self-sacrifice and self-realization. In both cases the individual is limited in his choice because he recognizes no other.

An individual, as such, is only partially free, for the minute complete freedom enters morality also enters and we have personality, not pure individuality. The individual is not a moral being; neither is he an unmoral being, but non-moral. We do not speak of an animal as being moral; morality is not associated with animals. Personality is the only basis of morality since it alone has complete freedom. It is only "as persons (that) we as moral, as persons we are free, as persons we have a meaning, a task, a value, that lifts us into the realm of the spiritual and imperishable.*

We see then, that the relation between personality and individuality is similar to the relation between universal and particular. That is to say individuals are particulars. For example, 'man' is not the name of an individual because there are many men each of whom is a man. But 'Socrates' is the name of an individual because there are not and can never be several Socrateses, each of whom is a Socrates. There may be several men called Socrates, but they do not constitute a class characterized by participation in a common 'Socrateitas' of which each affords an instance.**

*John Wright Buckham: Personality and the Christian Ideal, p. 34.

**cf. Clement C.J. Webb: God and Personality p. 92

It follows, then, that persons are individuals conscious of their universality, such consciousness occurring only when a certain level of development has been reached. Personality, therefore, is an achievement having its roots in a gift (individual); it is partially created by God and partially by the self. Thus personality is the uniting element between the spiritual and physical worlds.

PERSONALITY AND SOCIETY

I.

We must now turn our magic gem and peer into still another facet, this time matching for the colors formed by the light coming from another source. There are two indispensable and inseparable aspects of human life; the aspect of the person, and the aspect of society. The aspect of the person we have studied. The aspect of society then, becomes our next study, our other source of light.

On the first page of his book on Human Nature and the Social Order, Cooley says, "A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say a general, aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general. In other words 'society' and 'individuals'*do not denote separateable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing the relation between them being like that between other expressions one of which denotes a group as a whole and the other the members of the group."

What we find in this statement of Cooley's is that personality is the social unit, which with many others constitutes society. For example, if we step into the world of chemistry, the unit of structure is the atom, which with many others constitutes the element. Let us step out into the world of common objects. The building unit is the brick, without which we could not construct our buildings. The brick does not and cannot have any meaning a part from the building; the atom apart from the element,

*Cooley does not differentiate between personality and individuality.

personality apart from society.

"Human personality does not and cannot develop apart from society. The process of interpretation appreciation, and organization with which we become familiar have meaning and validity only in a social setting."* A complete view of society, then, would be a complete view of all the personalities in society. For, as we have said, personality is the social unit, and these units are organized into the kinship group, age group, sex group, family group, school group, state group and other so-called institutions.

Just as there is no view of society which is not a collective view of personalities, so there is no personality who may be regarded as a particular view of society. We cannot take a single person and say that he is a picture of society. Consider for a moment the symphony orchestra. It is only when all the instruments are playing together that we have an orchestra. The orchestra as a whole is not a view of any single instrument, but it is a view of all the separate pieces considered as a whole. So too, no single instrument may be considered a particular view of the orchestra.

Our problem, then, comes down to this: To how great an extent and in what manner is the growth of personality conditioned by social contacts, and what, if anything, is required of society on behalf of personality? But we cannot analyse society as a whole. Let us, then, make an appraisal of our various social institutions in relation to the personalities which they discover to them-selves.

*J. H. Coffin: Personality in the Making, p. 204

II

The family had in its beginning a biological purpose, the purpose of providing children with the physical protection necessary for survival. From this simple function the family has developed a social purpose which in its complexity and significance is far-reaching. It does more than minister to the physical needs of children; it serves society by its effect upon the various members of the family who live together in one house, and particularly by its influence upon the growing child. We must remember, as we study the family and its relations to personality, that the family system is based in fact upon love, not upon selfishness. It does not deprive any individual of his rights. It demands simply those rights which are one's own and the granting of which infringes not upon the rights of others.

The home, then, is the garden where the tender green shoots of a budding personality break forth into a new life. The growth and development of the personality is the resultant of the social contacts that are made. The child begins to receive reactions from his elders about him just as soon as he is able to make known his feelings and these reactions are incorporated into the sum-total of experience which he associates with his displayed feelings. Here we must tread with caution lest we slip into the quicksand of Behaviorism.* Personality is not a mechanical something; it is spiritual and can only be experienced in the spiritual world.

Human personality does not and cannot develop apart from society. In this process of personality development the home must necessarily have the foremost place since it provides the most productive stimulations by intimate social contacts at a time when the individual is in the

* see above page 7.

process of 'becoming' a person. "Experience shapes the personality and the home has the chief opportunity to furnish the experiences that set the personality for life " * says Ernest R Groves. Yes, the experience of others develops the personality and the home does have the chief opportunity to furnish these experiences but personality does not become set for life or any other length of time. Personality is dynamic and not static; it is a becoming that transcends the space-time world.

It is evident, is it not? that in the family are best conserved the interests of the helpless members of society. Not only do the children receive the physical care and moral training (which has its roots in personality), but the aged, the sick, the feeble and the slow minded are shielded far better than is possible under any method of community guardianship. It is the recognition of the rights of the helpless that is of aid in the development of personality. Here again we have one individual set over against another individual with personality arising when the one sees in the other that which is necessary to complete his own being.

"The fundamental conception of a true self-assertion and genuine self-sacrifice are learned only in the family. In it the strong learn to respect the weaker, the weak are encouraged to develop their strength by using it, under the influence of family love. The absoluteness of duty, and, true excellence of virtue, can be learned only in the family. Only a parent can say 'thou shalt'; and compel hearty obedience by the power of overmastering love. It is a most difficult task to inculcate duty and disciplined obedience in adults who have never learned them in the home. Loyal citizens of the state are made by sympathetic yet firm parental control. The home is the best generator of civic sentiments

*Ernest R. Groves: Social Problems of the Family, p.204

and virtuesThe self-sacrifice and devotion that are demanded in the larger community life are born and nourished in the family.*

In addition to being a place where self-discipline is encouraged, the family offers a spiritual helping hand that is not found in the larger society. "We all need, and children particularly need some inner circle of love which comes to us by virtue simply of our being, to help us when we make excursions in the world outside, in a world in which we are valued only for what we can achieve."**

III.

Since the family is by its very nature a personality-fostering institution it follows. does it not? that the larger family, the State, is also a personality-fostering organization.

Society does develop personality, Ernest Watson Burgess to the contract. This writer says, "Society cannot create personalities, nor develop them but it may some day be able to establish a social medium in which a larger number of individuals, endowed by nature with high potentialities, will develop themselves into splendid types of personality. But even in the best of cultural media the coarser genetic constitution will remain immune to the finer stimuli about them."***

Is it necessary to point out that there is no such thing as types of personality? Type is contradictory to personality. We may have different types of character but never personalities. Furthermore, an individual can never become a person, even if he is endowed by nature with the highest of potentialities, until he has been placed in an ethical-moral relationship with others. He cannot develop into a personality by him-

*J. M. Gillette: The Family and Society, p.14

**Anna Garlin Spencer: The Family and its Members, p.44

***Ernest Watson Burgess: Personality and the Social Group p.54

self. Mr. Burgess fails to realize that the "social medium" which he says is needed to develop personality is society itself. But, his whole conception of personality is a mechanical one. Personalities to him are the results of the "stimuli about them". Hence he is searching for some tangible thing which he may call a social medium.

The modern state is a personality-fostering institution because it undertakes to regulate the common life of the individuals composing it. It is necessary for the state to provide opportunities and to protect the rights of the citizen in his activities -- provided his activities are legitimate. This calls for a political organization which recognizes that its responsibilities lie in the welfare of the people, the development of personalities.

There are many forms which the state may take. For example, it may be monarchical, oligarchichal or democratic. There is no doubt but that public order can be maintained under any of these forms. Likewise the proper carrying out of public business is possible under such types of government. But which form of government makes for a higher, more ²worthful man? Surely it is only in a democracy that personality can come into its own. Richard M Vaughn is right when he says, "That government is best which produces the best men. And by best we mean men whose intellects, wills, and emotions have received the highest development. Measured by this test, democracy presents the loftiest possibilities."*

Why, you may ask, is a democracy so well fitted for personality development? It is self-government that develops men. Whenever there is group action, a leader is necessary. Self-government cannot dispense

*Richard M. Vaughn: The Significance of Personality, p.214

with leaders and it is through self-government that leaders are found. Put a man in a position to serve his fellow citizens put him in any public office, and, if he is not an unhealthy self, he will grow until he has realized a higher self. He learns self-restraint, he learns how to cooperate with others, he is thrown on his own initiative, he learns to respect others and thus becomes a more fully developed personality. It is in the "venturesome but fruitful faith in the untried man, in man as man,"* that a democracy surpasses all other forms of government.

All of us must adapt ourselves to the social order. To some this causes a feeling of conflict with personal freedom. Some individuals feel that established standards kill initiative. But it is true, as Professor Flewelling points out, that "usually those who chafe most at the conventions by which society protects itself, chafe not because of some good they would bring to society, but rather because they desire to live in utter disregard of the rights and comforts of others."** It is for this reason that we hear so much about unfair legislation. For example the Eighteenth Amendment is said to be an infringement upon personal freedom. But the individuals making such a charge fail to realize that this is an age of machinery and speed. Intoxicants and machinery cannot be mixed. When speed is added the danger is increased many times. It is not the life or well being of one that is at stake, but of many; for no one can tell how far reaching the effects of a single act may be.

We find ourselves, then, in a social order and we must learn to cooperate with that order, not as it is, but as it should be as a perfect society where there is the reciprocal recognition of rights and duties. As in the case of the Volstead Act, this brings conflict to

*John Wright Buckham: Personality and the Christian Ideal p.48

**Ralph Tyler Flewelling: Creative Personality, p.290

some, but it is only through the self-sacrificing of a few that the highest good for the greatest number is brought about. So it is that because we live in society we must find ourselves through society.

Progress means that there must be change. Hence if we are to have social progress we must have social change. And that means that some of us must put aside our own ideas and adapt those of others. This adaptation to others is not a weakness but a power for it takes real strength and foresight to see that it is for the future welfare of society to say "Thy will be done." But progress does not mean revolution. We must cling to the past by keeping a firm hold upon all that is of the highest value to society until something better is found to take its place. Here is where personality makes its highest contribution. It not only receives but it also contributes. It is when a great personality realizes himself that he brings great progress to the social order.

Professor Flewelling stated a great truth when he said, "The law of successful personality, like the law of successful life even among plants, is not a capacity for receiving but capacity for giving."* Thus it is that the best fruit tree is not one that requires the most food and care, but the one that produces the most fruit. All of us, as personalities, must contribute something toward the progress of society.

We have said that the greater number of our criminals are people who are selfish, who are self-satisfying individuals. We can say now that these are the people who chafe when put in the harness. They refuse to pull with the rest and hence society must of necessity restrain them. "The Stoics used to say that the selfish man is a cancer in the universe. A cancer is caused by the unchecked proliferation of cellular tissue

*ibid., p.291.

by one organ independently of the rest of the body. The parallel is therefore scientifically exact."* But is society's treatment of criminals justified?

The great contribution of society is the discovering of persons to themselves so that when an individual becomes a person the Platonic ideal of Trust, Goodness and Beauty are genuine expressions of the harmonious intergration of the person with society and with the universe.

IV.

We have seen whay the Family and the State have to offer toward the development of personality. We need to consider next the Church. The task of the Church is worship, fellowship, instruction and service. As a center for fellowship it is a center for personality development, for personality is a capacity for fellowship. As Christians we recognize that in every individual there is infinite worth, either actual or potential. So it is that the Church under the inspiration of this feeling for humanity has turned to the contemplation of the personality of Jesus Christ and hence is rising to a more lofty idea of its responsibilities toward the world.

Worship subordinates the finite self to the infinite; it is the conscious outgoing of the personality in its imperfection to the Perfect Personality. "In the worship of God man dies to the temporal interests and narrow ends of the exclusive self, and lives in an ever-expanding life in the life of others manifesting more and more that spiritual principle which is the life of God, who lives and loves in all things."** That fosters true personality.

But there is something more that worship which aids in developing

*W.R Inge: Personal Idealism and Mysticism, p.11

**A.B.D.Alexander: Christianity and Ethics p.219

personality. When we attend church the music may lift us into the spiritual realm or the sermon may be a means by which we may enter it, but the real value lies in being with kindred souls in the presence of God, knit together by a common devotion to Christ. That is the true function of Christianity to bring men into contact with God through the personality of Jesus Christ. And to make this contact an individual must identify himself in mind and spirit with Christ. As therefore ye received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk in him, rooted and builded up in him." Personality is the supreme Christian value; to attain it involves some sort of ethical change of life; and this is acquired through the personality of Jesus Christ.

PERSONALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE.

We have considered briefly the history of the idea of personality, we have glanced at the relation between personality and individuality, and we have looked into the problem of personality as effected by society. We have done this to show that morality cannot exist apart from personality; that personality is the basis of ethics.

We must bear in mind that most men care little for theory, but are quick to feel the prevailing tone. That is one reason why we have crime waves and the like. We must bring our ethics into the lives of the people; otherwise of what value is theory? We need an ethic which will show that religion must be co-extensive with life, spiritualizing all its activities and relationships.

The fact of ethical interest from which we must proceed is that man in virtue of his apiritual nature is an end unto himself. The basis of morality, then, is to be found in our sense of the intrinsic worth of human personality. That of course is central in the teaching of Christianity. Immanuel Kant gave this principle a new impetus in the field of philosophy when he said "so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only."*

There are two views of human nature which have generally been taken as the basis of ethics: The view that man is by nature morally good and the view that man is by nature wholly bad. The first view holds that from birth man is wholly virtuous and required only to be left alone to emerge into a life of perfection. This doctrine finds some support in both the Old and New Testaments. Among the Greeks it is found among the Stoics and in the eighteenth century Rousseau is its chief exponent.**

*Kant's Theory of Ethics p.47. Translated by Abbott

**cf. A B.D.Alexander: Christianity and Ethics, p.56.

If this view were true we would have evidence of the perfect life among savages. But nowhere is the noble savage to be found. The native instincts of man are simply potencies or capacities for morality, and, as we saw, require contact with others for development. It is only in relation to a world of moral beings, or persons, that the moral life becomes possible for man.

The view that man is wholly depraved has support in many passages in the New Testament. Augustine was the first to formulate it into a doctrine. In Calvinism the doctrine also finds support.*

If man were wholly bad, that is if he had no susceptibility for virtue and truth, then there would be nothing in him which could respond to the personalities about him nor to God. Hence he could never become a moral being.

Personality takes account of both views. In realizing that there is infinite worth in man Personalism** makes the view that by nature man is wholly depraved, untenable. Neither is the view that man is wholly good an acceptable one as seen from the position of Personalism. There is infinite worth in man, true, but it must become actual and not remain potential. Hence we see that every individual has obligations toward himself. He must have self-respect and self-fulfillment to become a person. His potential worth rises into actuality only through social and individual factors.

If ethics has its roots in personality it has reference to our fellow men as well as to ourselves. We have seen that self-realization

*Ibid. p.57

**By Personalism I mean that theistic doctrine which takes account of personality as outlined above.

is an inadequate approach to the moral goal. "The noblest self-realizations can come only through self-forgetful service to other personalities." * It follows, then, that the basic obligation to our fellow men is reverence of personality. It is disesteem which causes man's inhumanity to man.

Consider the criminal again. We all have different ideas of criminals, but many of us fail to realize that most of them are not depraved, half-beastlike beings, but only ordinary human beings. The modern dealer of woe is a respected well-dressed cultured man who does not have the ear-marks of the low-type criminal. Why are they criminals? They have violated society's laws; they have failed in their reverence for personality. Society must protect itself, it is true, but is society's treatment of criminals justified? Shall we let the criminal become more criminal in his ways or shall we prepare him for useful citizenship?

Thomas Mott Osborne tells us that society must recognize the importance of its relations to its prisons. ** He warns us that in thinking of the man within prison walls we must not regard him as some wild beast to be trapped and caged and broken, but as a man, weak or strong, vicious or well-intentioned, but always as a man, moved by the same instincts as ourselves outraged by brutal treatment, softened by kindly treatment as we ourselves are. We must strive to bring out whatever worth is in the man that he may become useful to society. It is only when the proper reverence for personality has taken possession of our hearts that social injustice will cease.

Why do men do right? Some men do right in the hope of a reward,

*Richard M. Vaughan: The Significance of Personality, p.198

**Thomas Mott Osborne: Society and Prisons

or from fear of punishment or as a means to happiness. But is it not true that to be moral an act must be done because there is a feeling of obligation?

It is only when the sense of personality arises, when men recognize reciprocal rights and obligations that morality enters. If men act from a sense of duty, and from duty alone, morality is other-worldly, it is spiritual in origin and nature. There is nothing in the world of nature which can account for the conviction of "I Ought." Personality alone is responsible for such a conviction.

The great men of history have been men who have done right for right's sake, who did not count the cost of doing right. The outstanding men have been those who realized that no matter how much a man may act without regard for consequences actions always have consequences which have a bearing upon his life and the lives of others, and hence have governed their actions accordingly. But right for right's sake, if taken apart from personality, always turns out to be right for might's sake.

The antithesis of right of right's sake is might makes right and is put forth by Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic.^{*} His argument runs as follows: In every state it is considered unjust to violate laws. Now laws are framed to serve the interests of the government. Since the government is stronger than its subjects, it follows that justice is the interest of the stronger, or, might makes right. Socrates refutes the argument by pointing out that a government often makes mistakes and enacts laws which are detrimental to its own interests. Since the subject must in every instance obey the laws of the land it follows that it is often just for the subject to do what is prejudicial to the interests

*Plato: Republic, Book 1

of the government, that is, what is not for the interest of the stronger. Hence , might is not right.

Can we get morality out of group convention? That is, is it the action of the mob that determines what is right? No. We are not moral beings when we are running with a crowd. It is only when we stand off from the crowd with our own rights and duties, when we cease being an individual and become a person, that we are moral beings.

Therefore, my conclusion is, that since man is by nature neither wholly good nor wholly bad, since is is disesteem which causes man's inhumanity to man, since to do right for the hope of a reward or from the fear of punishment or as a means to happiness is not moral, since right for right's sake or might makes right are false ethical doctrines, and since we cannot find morality in group convention, the subject-object relationship where there is the recognition of reciprocal rights and duties, claims and counterclaims, is the basis of human ethics. It has been the purpose of this paper to show that this subject-object relationship is personality. We have traced the meaning of the term personality and found that it is the only subject-object. We have shown that an individual becomes a person when he recognizes this subject-object relationship between himself and other individuals, we have seen how the Family, the State and the Church develop in the individual this capacity to recognize in others rights and duties. Since we have seen that personality is this subject-object relationship it follows, then, that personality is the basis of ethics.

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